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This paper discusses the relevance of Indigenous law to Aboriginal title in Canada, 
as revealed in three leading Supreme Court decisions: Delgamuukw v. British 
Columbia,1 R. v. Marshall; R. v. Bernard,2 and Tsilhqot’in Nation v. British 
Columbia.3 It concludes that Indigenous law relates to Aboriginal title in two 
ways: it is part of the evidence that can be relied upon to establish the exclusive 
occupation necessary for title at the time of Crown assertion of sovereignty, and it 
continues thereafter to govern the communal land rights of the Aboriginal 
titleholders. Moreover, the content of Indigenous law is not frozen at the moment 
of Crown sovereignty – it is dynamic and alterable by the Indigenous people 
concerned in accordance with their own system of governance. 
 This paper is extracted from a longer paper on St. Catherine’s Milling and 
Lumber Company v. The Queen,4 which is why the discussion of the three 
Supreme Court decisions relates them to the Privy Council’s decision in that early 
case. 
 
1.  Delgamuukw v. British Columbia 
As anyone reading this paper is probably familiar with the Delgamuukw case, I am 
going to confine my discussion of it to Chief Justice Lamer’s treatment of the St. 
Catherine’s decision and his elaboration of the sources and nature of Aboriginal 
                     
1 Delgamuukw v. British Columbia, [1997] 3 S.C.R. 1010 [Delgamuukw, S.C.C.]. 
2 [2005] 2 S.C.R. 220 [Marshall/Bernard]. 
3 Tsilhqot’in Nation v. British Columbia, [2014] 2 S.C.R. 257 [Tsilhqot’in Nation, S.C.C.] 
4 (1888) 14 App. Cas. 46 [St. Catherine’s, P.C.]. 
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title. Regarding St. Catherine’s, he stated: 
The starting point of the Canadian jurisprudence on aboriginal title is 
the Privy Council’s decision in St. Catherine’s Milling and Lumber 
Co. v. The Queen (1888), 14 App. Cas. 46, which described aboriginal 
title as a “personal and usufructuary right” (at p. 54). The subsequent 
jurisprudence has attempted to grapple with this definition, and has in 
the process demonstrated that the Privy Council’s choice of 
terminology is not particularly helpful to explain the various 
dimensions of aboriginal title. What the Privy Council sought to 
capture is that aboriginal title is a sui generis interest in land. 
Aboriginal title has been described as sui generis in order to 
distinguish it from “normal” proprietary interests, such as fee simple. 
However, as I will now develop, it is also sui generis in the sense that 
its characteristics cannot be completely explained by reference either 
to the common law rules of real property or to the rules of property 
found in aboriginal legal systems. As with other aboriginal rights, it 
must be understood by reference to both common law and aboriginal 
perspectives.5 
 
On the “personal” aspect of Aboriginal title, Lamer C.J. explained that this simply 
means it is inalienable other than by surrender to the Crown, not that it is “a non-
proprietary interest which amounts to no more than a licence to use and occupy the 
land and cannot compete on an equal footing with other proprietary interests”.6 
 Turning to the source of Aboriginal title, he said that 
... it had originally been thought that the source of aboriginal title in 
Canada was the Royal Proclamation, 1763: see St. Catherine’s 
Milling. However, it is now clear that although aboriginal title was 
recognized by the Proclamation, it arises from the prior occupation of 
Canada by aboriginal peoples. That prior occupation, however, is 
relevant in two different ways, both of which illustrate the sui generis 
nature of aboriginal title. The first is the physical fact of occupation, 
which derives from the common law principle that occupation is proof 
of possession in law.... Thus, in Guerin [Guerin v. The Queen, [1984] 
2 S.C.R. 335] Dickson J. described aboriginal title, at p. 376, as a 
                     
5 Delgamuukw, S.C.C., above note 1 at para. 112. 
6 Ibid. at para. 113, citing Canadian Pacific Ltd. v. Paul, [1988] 2 S.C.R. 654 at 677. 
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“legal right derived from the Indians’ historic occupation and 
possession of their tribal lands”.... [I]n Roberts v. Canada, [1989] 1 
S.C.R. 322, ... this Court unanimously held at p. 340 that “aboriginal 
title pre-dated colonization by the British and survived British claims 
of sovereignty” (also see Guerin at p. 378). What this suggests is a 
second source for aboriginal title – the relationship between common 
law and pre-existing systems of aboriginal law.7 
 
Chief Justice Lamer thus followed the Court’s rejection in Calder v. Attorney-
General of British Columbia8 of the Privy Council’s ruling in St. Catherine’s that 
Aboriginal title comes from the Royal Proclamation of 1763; instead, it is rooted in 
pre-colonization occupation of land by the Indigenous peoples and in their pre-
existing systems of law. 
 At common law, Chief Justice Lamer explained, “the fact of physical 
occupation is proof of possession at law, which in turn will ground title to the 
land”.9 So if Aboriginal claimants are able to prove that they are descended from 
or are the successors to Indigenous people who were in exclusive occupation of 
specific lands at the time the British Crown asserted sovereignty, they will have 
Aboriginal title in the absence of adequate proof by the Crown of subsequent 
extinguishment of their title.10 Indigenous law is relevant to proof of occupation 
because an Indigenous land tenure system, laws governing land use, and trespass 
laws, to give Lamer C.J.’s examples, could be relied upon to establish the 
                     
7 Delgamuukw, S.C.C., above note 1 at para. 114. Compare the concurring judgment of La Forest 
J., especially at para. 190: “the aboriginal right of possession is derived from the historic 
occupation and use of ancestral lands by aboriginal peoples. Put another way, ‘aboriginal title’ is 
based on the continued occupation and use of the land as part of the aboriginal peoples’ 
traditional way of life.” 
8 [1973] S.C.R. 313. 
9 Delgamuukw, S.C.C., above note 1 at para. 149. For detailed discussion, see McNeil, Common 
Law Aboriginal Title (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1989). 
10 Delgamuukw, S.C.C., above note 1. On extinguishment, see Kent McNeil, “Extinguishment of 
Aboriginal Title in Canada: Treaties, Legislation, and Judicial Discretion” (2001-2002) 33 
Ottawa L. Rev. 301 [McNeil, “Extinguishment of Aboriginal Title”]. 
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exclusive occupation required for title.11 But if the only use of Indigenous law is as 
evidence of the occupation that grounds title at common law, can Indigenous law 
really be a second source of Aboriginal title, as Lamer C.J. suggested? His 
references to passages from Roberts v. Canada and Guerin in the quotation in the 
preceding paragraph certainly imply that Indigenous systems of law that were in 
existence at the time of Crown assertion of sovereignty continued thereafter and 
are relevant, not just as evidence of occupation at that time, but as a source of 
Aboriginal title in their own right.12 However, his description of the content of 
Aboriginal title is not consistent with what is known as the doctrine of continuity, 
whereby Aboriginal title to land based on and defined by Indigenous laws and 
customs pre-dated and continued after British colonization.13 If that doctrine 
applied to Aboriginal title in Canada, one would expect the content of that title to 
vary greatly in different parts of the country in accordance with the vast diversity 
in Indigenous cultures and land use. Instead, the Chief Justice’s elaboration on the 
content of Aboriginal title reveals that it is what Brian Slattery has described as a 
generic right that does not vary from one Indigenous people to another.14 
 On content as well as source, Chief Justice Lamer’s judgment also rejects 
Lord Watson’s description of Aboriginal title in the St. Catherine’s case. In that 
case, his Lordship not only referred to Aboriginal title as “a personal and 
                     
11 Delgamuukw, S.C.C., above note 1 at paras. 148, 157. 
12 The Guerin citation references the page where Dickson J. cited Amodu Tijani v. Secretary, 
Southern Nigeria, [1921] 2 A.C. 399 (P.C.), as authority that “a change in sovereignty over a 
particular territory does not in general affect the presumptive title of the inhabitants.” 
13 See Brian Slattery, The Land Rights of Indigenous Canadian Peoples (Saskatoon: University of 
Saskatchewan Native Law Centre, 1979), 50-59; Mark D. Walters, “The ‘Golden Thread’ of 
Continuity: Aboriginal Customs at Common Law and Under the Constitution Act, 1982” (1999) 
44 McGill L.J. 711; Kent McNeil and David Yarrow, “Has Constitutional Recognition of 
Aboriginal Rights Adversely Affected Their Definition?” (2007) 37 Supreme Court L. Rev. (2nd) 
177 at 203-11. 
14 Brian Slattery, “A Taxonomy of Aboriginal Rights”, in Hamar Foster, Heather Raven, and 
Jeremy Webber, eds., Let Right Be Done: Aboriginal Title, the Calder Case, and the Future of 
Indigenous Rights (Vancouver: UBC Press, 2007), 111 at 118. 
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usufructuary right”, but also dismissed the federal government’s argument that the 
Saulteaux had “the entire property of the land”, deciding instead that the “Crown 
has all along had a present proprietary estate in the land, upon which the Indian 
title was a mere burden.”15 Lamer C.J. avoided disagreeing directly with Lord 
Watson by remarking that, although his Lordship “described the aboriginal title as 
a ‘personal and usufructuary right’, [he] declined to explain what that meant 
because it was not ‘necessary to express any opinion upon the point’”.16 Admitting 
that “the courts have been less than forthcoming” in defining Aboriginal title, 
Lamer C.J. addressed the issue directly and concluded that 
... the content of aboriginal title can be summarized by two 
propositions: first, that aboriginal title encompasses the right to 
exclusive use and occupation of the land held pursuant to that title for 
a variety of purposes, which need not be aspects of those aboriginal 
practices, customs and traditions which are integral to distinctive 
aboriginal cultures; and second, that those protected uses must not be 
irreconcilable with the nature of the group’s attachment to that land.17 
 
He expressly rejected the Crown’s argument that Aboriginal title is limited to 
traditional uses of the land, deciding instead that it is an all-encompassing property 
right that includes natural resources on and under the ground, subject only to an 
inherent limit that prevents the land from being used in ways that are irreconcilable 
with the relationship with the land giving rise to the Aboriginal title.18 
Consequently, the land cannot be put to uses that would destroy its unique value to 
the Indigenous people in question, such as strip-mining a hunting ground or turning 
land that has special ceremonial or cultural significance into a parking lot, but 
                     
15 St. Catherine’s, P.C., above note 4 at 54, 58. 
16 Delgamuukw, S.C.C., above note 1 at para. 116, quoting St. Catherine’s, P.C., above note 4 at 
54, 55. 
17 Delgamuukw, S.C.C., above note 1 at para. 117. 
18 For discussion, see “The Post-Delgamuukw Nature and Content of Aboriginal Title”, in Kent 
McNeil, Emerging Justice? Essays on Indigenous Rights in Canada and Australia (Saskatoon: 
University of Saskatchewan Native Law Centre, 2001), 136 [McNeil, Emerging Justice?], 102. 
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otherwise Aboriginal title “allows for a full range of uses of the land”.19 
 So what role does Indigenous law play in relation to Aboriginal title, other 
than as part of the evidence that can be relied upon to prove exclusive occupation 
at the time of Crown assertion of sovereignty? While Chief Justice Lamer did not 
answer this question, surely Indigenous law did not cease to exist at that moment, 
to be instantaneously replaced by the common law and applicable statute law of 
England.20 Such a result would have created legal chaos in Indigenous 
communities, as the law of England would have been unknown and unenforceable 
there at the time. In Delgamuukw, the Supreme Court accepted that Crown 
assertion of sovereignty in British Columbia took place in 1846, the year of the 
Oregon Boundary Treaty that established the boundary between British and 
American territory in the Pacific Northwest along the 49th parallel.21 At the time, 
there was very little British presence in the territories of the Gitksan and 
Wet’suwet’en Nations whose rights were in question in Delgamuukw, and certainly 
                     
19 Delgamuukw, S.C.C., above note 1 at paras. 128, 132. Note that the inherent limit has been 
modified somewhat in the Court’s more recent decision in Tsilhqot’in Nation, S.C.C., above note 
3 at para. 74, where McLachlin C.J. placed emphasis on forward-looking sustainability rather 
than on backward-looking protection of the land for traditional uses: see Brian Slattery, “The 
Constitutional Dimensions of Aboriginal Title” (2015) 71 Supreme Court L. Rev. (2d) 45 at 58-
63 [Slattery, “Constitutional Dimensions”].  
20 For legal opinions that this did not happen to French law when English law was introduced in 
Quebec by the Royal Proclamation of 1763, see C. Yorke and Wm de Grey, Report of Attorney 
and Solicitor General Regarding the Civil Government of Quebec, to the Lords of the Committee 
of Council for Plantation Affairs in London, 14 April 1766, in Adam Shortt and Arthur G. 
Doughty, Documents Relating to the Constitutional History of Canada, 1759-1791 (Ottawa: J. de 
L. Taché, Printer to the King’s Most Excellent Majesty, 1918), 251-57, especially 254-55; 
Report of Solicitor General Alex. Wedderburn, 6 December 1772, ibid. at 424-37, especially 
425; Report of Attorney General, Edwd. Thurlow, 22 January 1773, ibid. at 437-45, especially 
440-44; Drulard v. Welsh (1906) 11 O.L.R. 647 (Ont. Div. Ct.), reversed on other grounds, 
(1907) 14 O.L.R. 54 (Ont. C.A.). 
21 Delgamuukw, S.C.C., above note 1 at para. 145. For critical assessment, see Kent McNeil, 
“Negotiated Sovereignty: Indian Treaties and the Acquisition of American and Canadian 
Territorial Rights in the Pacific Northwest”, in Alexandra Harmon, ed., The Power of Promises: 




no British police officers, judges, or other government officials. Gitksan and 
Wet’suwet’en life carried on as before, necessarily governed by their own laws and 
their own systems of governance.22 
 Yet Aboriginal title to the lands exclusively occupied by the Gitksan and 
Wet’suwet’en Nations vested in them the moment the Crown asserted sovereignty 
in 1846.23 This title, as described by Chief Justice Lamer, gave them a right to 
exclusive possession and use of the land that would, in principle, have been legally 
enforceable from that time forward, disregarding the practical aspects involved in 
enforcement against the Crown and third parties. Exclusivity as against the outside 
world is the external dimension of Aboriginal title that allows it to “compete on an 
equal footing with other proprietary interests”.24 But in his judgment Lamer C.J. 
did not explain how the right of possession and use that Aboriginal title confers 
operates internally, other than to say that aboriginal title “is a collective right to 
land held by all members of an aboriginal nation” and that “[d]ecisions with 
respect to that land are also made by that community.”25 The evidence presented at 
trial revealed that, from time immemorial, the Gitksan and Wet’suwet’en have had 
complex systems of law that govern land holding and use within their 
communities.26 As both a practical and legal matter, those laws would have 
                     
22 See Delgamuukw v. British Columbia, (1991) 79 D.L.R. (4th) 185 (B.C.S.C.) [Delgamuukw, 
B.C.S.C.], headings “5. The Historical Period” and “6. The Colony of British Columbia”. 
23 Delgamuukw, S.C.C., above note 1, Lamer C.J. at para. 145: “aboriginal title crystallized at the 
time sovereignty was asserted.” For reasons relating to the way the case was pleaded and the way 
the trial judge dealt with the oral histories, the Supreme Court did not issue a declaration of title, 
deciding instead to send the matter back to trial to determine what lands had been exclusively 
occupied by the Gitksan and Wet’suwet’en in 1846. The case has not been retried. 
24 Ibid. at para. 113. 
25 Ibid. at para. 115. 
26 See Delgamuukw, B.C.S.C., above note 22. See also Richard Overstall, “Encountering the 
Spirit in the Land: ‘Property’ in a Kinship-Based Legal Order”, in John McLaren, A.R. Buck, 
and Nancy E. Wright, eds., Despotic Dominion: Property Rights in British Settler Societies 
(Vancouver: UBC Press, 2005), 22; Valerie Ruth Napoleon, “Ayook: Gitksan Legal Order, Law, 
and Legal Theory”, unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, University of Victoria Faculty of Law, 2009. 
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continued in force after Crown assertion of sovereignty in 1846, and would 
necessarily have been alterable by those nations through the exercise of their 
decision-making authority, which given the communal nature of their rights would 
have to be governmental in nature.27 
 So “the relationship between common law and pre-existing systems of 
aboriginal law” that Chief Justice Lamer suggested “is a second source for 
aboriginal title”28 can be understood by taking into account the fact that Aboriginal 
title has two dimensions, one external and the other internal. The external 
dimension arises from exclusive occupation of land and the exclusive rights of 
possession and use that the common law confers against the outside world. 
Indigenous law can be used to help prove the exclusive occupation giving rise to 
this external dimension, but it does not apply to define the rights externally. Nor 
does it define the content of those rights, as the content does not vary from one 
group of Indigenous people to another, regardless of variation in their legal orders. 
It does, however, apply internally to govern the rights and authority of the 
Aboriginal titleholders among themselves and in relation to others who seek to use 
                     
27 See Brian Slattery, “The Metamorphosis of Aboriginal Title” (2006) 85 Can. Bar Rev. 255 at 
270 [Slattery, “Metamorphosis”]; Slattery, “Constitutional Dimensions”, above note 19 at 52-54; 
Jeremy Webber, “The Public Law Dimension of Indigenous Property Rights”, in Nigel Bankes 
and Timo Koivurova, eds., The Proposed Nordic Saami Convention: National and International 
Dimensions of Indigenous Property Rights (Oxford: Hart Publishing, 2013), 79. Aboriginal 
nations’ inherent right of self-government over their Aboriginal title lands was acknowledged by 
Williamson J. in Campbell v. British Columbia, [2000] 4 C.N.L.R. 1 (B.C.S.C.): see discussion 
in Kent McNeil, “Judicial Approaches to Self-Government since Calder: Searching for Doctrinal 
Coherence”, in Foster, Raven, and Webber, above note 14, 129 at 139-43. In House of Sga’nisim 
v. Canada (Attorney General), [2012] 2 C.N.L.R. 82 (B.C.S.C.), Smith J. followed Campbell out 
of comity, but also held that the governance provisions of the Nisga’a Final Agreement, 1998, 
the validity of which was challenged in these cases, could be upheld as delegated governmental 
authority. Smith J.’s decision was affirmed on appeal on the latter basis, without deciding the 
inherent right issue: 2013 BCCA 49, [2013] 2 C.N.L.R. 226, leave to appeal refused, [2013] 
S.C.C.A. No. 44. For commentary, see Joshua Nichols, “A Reconciliation without Recollection? 
Chief Mountain and the Sources of Sovereignty” (2015) 48 U.B.C. L. Rev. 515. 
28 Delgamuukw, S.C.C., above note 1 at para. 114. 
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their lands. Indigenous law is therefore a source of their internal communal rights, 
whereas the common law is a source of their external rights. Aboriginal title can 
therefore only be understood by reference to both systems of law and by taking 
into account the relationship between them. To repeat Chief Justice Lamer’s 
words, “its characteristics cannot be completely explained by reference either to 
the common law rules of real property or to the rules of property found in 
aboriginal legal systems. As with other aboriginal rights, it must be understood by 
reference to both common law and aboriginal perspectives.”29 And given that it 
would be impractical and even absurd for the Indigenous law governing internal 
rights to be arbitrarily frozen at the moment of Crown assertion of sovereignty, 
Aboriginal titleholders must have the authority to alter their laws in relation to land 
as their societies and the environments in which they live change. This authority to 
make and revise law is necessarily governmental. 
 
2.  R. v. Marshall; R. v. Bernard 
 
R. v. Marshall and R. v. Bernard are companion cases arising out of prosecutions 
under provincial legislation in Nova Scotia and New Brunswick for illegal 
harvesting and possession of timber from Crown land. The accused Mi’kmaqs 
raised treaty rights and Aboriginal title as defences. The Supreme Court issued a 
single judgment, rejecting these defences and upholding the convictions imposed at 
trial. Chief Justice McLachlin delivered the main judgment, with Justice LeBel 
delivering a judgment for himself and Justice Fish that concurred in result but 
differed substantially in reasons. The focus of the judgments was on proof of 
Aboriginal title, with all the judges agreeing that the evidence did not establish the 
exclusive occupation of the cutting sites needed to prove Aboriginal title.30 
                     
29 Ibid. at para. 112. 
30 On whether the occupation needs to be site-specific, see Kent McNeil, “Aboriginal Title in 
10 
 
 Given the focus on proof, McLachlin C.J. did not have a lot to say about the 
sources and content of Aboriginal title. Nor did she mention the St. Catherine’s 
case, even in the context of the Royal Proclamation of 1763, which the accused 
argued had “reserved to the Mi’kmaq title in all unceded, unpurchased land in the 
former Nova Scotia, which later was divided into Nova Scotia and New 
Brunswick.”31 Without referring to either Calder or Delgamuukw in this context, 
she affirmed the rulings in those decisions that the Proclamation is not an 
independent source of Aboriginal title, implicitly deciding that it affirms pre-
existing rights rather than creating new ones.32 
 Chief Justice McLachlin’s discussion of Aboriginal title emphasized the role 
of the common law, starting with this statement: “Where title to lands formerly 
occupied by an aboriginal people has not been surrendered, a claim for aboriginal 
title to the land may be made under the common law.”33 Relying on Delgamuukw, 
she nonetheless acknowledged that, in assessing claims to Aboriginal title, “the 
Court must consider both the aboriginal perspective and the common law 
perspective.”34 She then elaborated on what this means: 
The Court’s task in evaluating a claim for an aboriginal right is to 
examine the pre-sovereignty aboriginal practice and translate that 
practice, as faithfully and objectively as it can, into a modern legal 
right.... This exercise involves both aboriginal and European 
perspectives. The Court must consider the pre-sovereignty practice 
from the perspective of the aboriginal people. But in translating it to a 
common law right, the Court must also consider the European 
perspective; the nature of the right at common law must be examined 
to determine whether a particular aboriginal practice fits it.35 
                                                                  
Canada: Site-Specific or Territorial?” (2012) 91 Can. Bar Rev. 745 [McNeil, “Aboriginal Title in 
Canada”], and Tsilhqot’in Nation, S.C.C., above note 3. 
31 Marshall/Bernard, above note 2 at para. 85. 
32 LeBel and Fish JJ. concurred on this issue: ibid. at para. 111. 
33 Ibid. at para. 38. 
34 Ibid. at para. 46. 




She emphasized that “to insist that the pre-sovereignty practices correspond in 
some broad sense to the modern right claimed, is not to ignore the aboriginal 
perspective. The aboriginal perspective grounds the analysis and imbues its every 
step. It must be considered in evaluating the practice at issue, and a generous 
approach must be taken in matching it to the appropriate modern right.”36 
 In the passages just quoted, Chief Justice McLachlin was referring to 
Aboriginal rights generally, but she then applied the same methodology of 
translating practices into rights to Aboriginal title. “One of these rights”, she said, 
“is aboriginal title to land. It is established by aboriginal practices that indicate 
possession similar to that associated with title at common law. In matching 
common law property rules to aboriginal practice we must be sensitive to the 
context-specific nature of common law title, as well as the aboriginal 
perspective.”37 Sensitivity to the Aboriginal perspective involves evaluating the 
practices from the point of view of the Aboriginal society and taking their manner 
of life into account. McLachlin C.J. elaborated by quoting with approval the 
following passage from La Forest J.’s concurring judgment in Delgamuukw: 
 ... when dealing with a claim of “aboriginal title”, the court will focus 
on the occupation and use of the land as part of the aboriginal 
society’s traditional way of life. In pragmatic terms, this means 
looking at the manner in which the society used the land to live, 
namely to establish villages, to work, to get to work, to hunt, to travel 
to hunting grounds, to fish, to get to fishing pools, to conduct religious 
rites, etc. [Emphasis in original].38 
 
But the practices must be sufficient to prove occupation as a matter of fact in order 
                     
36 Ibid. at para. 50. 
37 Ibid. at para. 54. 
38 Ibid. at para. 49, quoting from Delgamuukw, S.C.C., above note 1 at para. 194. 
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to be translated into title at common law,39 and “‘[o]ccupation’ means ‘physical 
occupation’. This ‘may be established in a variety of ways, ranging from the 
construction of dwellings through cultivation and enclosure of fields to regular use 
of definite tracts of land for hunting, fishing or otherwise exploiting its 
resources’.”40 
 For the purposes of this paper, Chief Justice McLachlin’s judgment in 
Marshall/Bernard is remarkable for a couple of reasons. First, it conflates proof of 
Aboriginal title and other Aboriginal rights, so that both depend on historical 
practices that are then translated into modern-day rights. While this methodology 
may work for hunting, fishing, and wood harvesting rights that are usually based on 
practices that give rise to these specific rights,41 with all due respect I question its 
application to Aboriginal title.42 As we have seen, the common law source of 
Aboriginal title is occupation of land, which is based in part on practices, but as 
Chief Justice Lamer stated in Delgamuukw, it can also be established through proof 
of Indigenous law, such trespass laws and laws governing land tenure and use.43 
When she said that “‘[o]ccupation’ means ‘physical occupation’”, McLachlin C.J. 
disregarded the relevance of Indigenous law to proof of occupation. Moreover, 
where Aboriginal title rather than other Aboriginal rights is concerned, it is not the 
practices that get translated into rights; instead, the practices are evidence of 
                     
39 Marshall/Bernard, above note 2 at para. 54. 
40 Ibid. at para. 56, McLachlin C.J. quoting in the last sentence from Lamer C.J. in Delgamuukw, 
S.C.C., above note 1 at para. 149. 
41 Though Aboriginal rights are based on “practices, customs and traditions”, which can include 
Indigenous laws (see R. v. Van der Peet, [1996] 2 S.C.R. 507, Lamer C.J. at paras. 44-48, 
McLachlin J., dissenting on other grounds, at paras. 263-69), in the numerous cases since Van 
der Peet the focus of the evidence has usually been on practices: e.g. see R. v. Adams, [1996] 3 
S.C.R. 101; R. v. Côté, [1996] 3 S.C.R. 139; R. v. Sappier; R. v. Gray, [2006] 2 S.C.R. 686; Lax 
Kw’alaams Indian Band v. Canada (Attorney General), [2011] 3 S.C.R. 535. 
42 For more detailed critical discussion, see Kent McNeil, “Aboriginal Title and the Supreme 
Court: What’s Happening?” (1996) 69 Sask. L. Rev. 281, especially at 297-300. 
43 Delgamuukw, S.C.C., above note 1 at paras. 148, 157. 
13 
 
occupation, which then gives rise to title. As we have seen, the title is uniform vis-
à-vis the outside world – unlike other Aboriginal rights, its content does not depend 
on the nature of the practices relied upon as evidence of the requisite occupation.44 
 Secondly, McLachlin C.J. did not refer at all to the parts of Lamer C.J.’s 
decision in Delgamuukw suggesting that Indigenous law and the relationship 
between it and the common law are a second source of Aboriginal title.45 From her 
judgment in Marshall/Bernard, it appears that she thought there is only one source 
of Aboriginal title – physical occupation of land.46 
 While agreeing that there was not sufficient evidence to support findings of 
Aboriginal title in Marshall/Bernard, Justice LeBel took a very different approach 
to title that sheds light on its source. Like McLachlin C.J., he did not mention the 
Privy Council decision in the St. Catherine’s case, but interestingly he did refer to 
Ritchie C.J.’s judgment in the Supreme Court of Canada in the case, noting that the 
Chief Justice had first used the concept of a usufruct “as an analogy to explain the 
relationship between Crown and aboriginal interests in the land.... A usufructuary 
title to all unsurrendered lands is understood to protect aboriginal peoples in the 
absolute use and enjoyment of their lands.”47 So although Indigenous land use 
varied greatly in different parts of Canada, the “fact that a tract of land was used for 
hunting instead of agriculture does not mean that the group did not possess the land 
in such a way as to acquire aboriginal title.”48 For LeBel J., the concept of a 
usufruct therefore conferred the entire dominium utile on the Aboriginal 
titleholders, regardless of the uses they made of the land prior to Crown assertion of 
                     
44 See text accompanying notes 14 and 17 above. 
45 See the quotations from Delgamuukw, S.C.C., above note 1, accompanying notes 5 and 7 
above. 
46 For further discussion, see McNeil, “Aboriginal Title in Canada”, above note 30. 
47 Marshall/Bernard, above note 2 at para. 135 [emphasis added], referring to St. Catharines 
Milling and Lumber Company v. The Queen (1887) 13 S.C.R. 577. 




 On the Aboriginal perspective, Justice LeBel observed that “aboriginal 
conceptions of territoriality, land-use and property should be used to modify and 
adapt the traditional common law concepts of property in order to develop an 
occupancy standard that incorporates both the aboriginal and common law 
approaches.”49 He acknowledged that “Aboriginal title has been recognized by the 
common law and is in part defined by the common law, but it is grounded in 
aboriginal customary laws relating to land. The interest is proprietary in nature and 
is derived from inter-traditional notions of ownership.”50 Addressing the matter of 
source directly, he said that “aboriginal title arises from the prior possession of land 
and the prior social organization and distinctive cultures of aboriginal peoples on 
that land.... It originates from ‘the prior occupation of Canada by aboriginal 
peoples’ and from ‘the relationship between common law and pre-existing systems 
of aboriginal law’ (Delgamuukw, at para. 114).”51 So unlike McLachlin C.J., Justice 
LeBel relied expressly on Lamer C.J.’s articulation of the dual sources of 
Aboriginal title in the common law and Indigenous law, and the relationship 
between them. He also disagreed with her view that the role of the Aboriginal 
perspective is “simply to help in the interpretation of aboriginal practices in order to 
assess whether they conform to common law concepts of title.”52 On the contrary, 
he said, “[t]he aboriginal perspective shapes the very concept of aboriginal title”, 
relying on John Borrows’ assertion that “Aboriginal law should not just be received 
as evidence that Aboriginal peoples did something in the past on a piece of land. It 
                     
49 Ibid. at para. 127. 
50 Ibid. at para. 128. 
51 Ibid. at para. 129. LeBel J. also quoted Lamer C.J.’s statement that Aboriginal title “cannot be 
completely explained by reference either to the common law rules of real property or to the rules 
of property found in aboriginal legal systems. As with other aboriginal rights, it must be 
understood by reference to both common law and aboriginal perspectives”: ibid., quoting from 
Delgamuukw, S.C.C., above note 1 at para. 112. 
52 Marshall/Bernard, above note 2 at para. 130. 
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is more than evidence: it is actually law.”53 
 Justice LeBel therefore seems to have regarded the role of Indigenous law as 
two-fold: it has to be taken into account in shaping the concept of Aboriginal title, 
but it is also part of the Aboriginal perspective on the occupation necessary to 
establish Aboriginal title. On the latter function, he stated in evident reference to 
Lamer C.J.’s decision in Delgamuukw that the “aboriginal perspective on the 
occupation of their land can also be gleaned in part, but not exclusively, from pre-
sovereignty systems of aboriginal law. The relevant laws consisted of elements of 
the practices, customs and traditions of aboriginal peoples and might include a land 
tenure system or laws governing land use.”54 As we have seen, this function of 
Indigenous law as evidence of occupation is an important aspect of Lamer C.J.’s 
judgment that was ignored by Chief Justice McLachlin in her majority decision in 
Marshall/Bernard. However, I am less sure of what Justice LeBel had in mind 
when he said that the Aboriginal perspective, which includes Indigenous law, 
“shapes the very concept of aboriginal title.”55 As discussed above, the Aboriginal 
title that Lamer C.J. described in Delgamuukw is generic in nature, and so does not 
vary from one instance to another. Yet Indigenous law does vary greatly across 
Canada,56 so if that law shapes the concept of title one would expect the title to vary 
as well. This cannot be what LeBel J. meant, as he relied heavily on Lamer C.J.’s 
judgment and appears to have been critical of McLachlin C.J. for not following it 
more closely. His remarks on the usufructuary nature of Aboriginal title cited earlier 
also reveal that he regarded Aboriginal title as entailing the entire beneficial interest 
                     
53 Ibid., quoting John Borrows, “Creating an Indigenous Legal Community” (2005) 50 McGill 
L.J. 153, at 173. 
54 Marshall/Bernard, above note 2 at para. 139, paraphrasing Delgamuukw, S.C.C., above note 1 
at para. 148. 
55 Marshall/Bernard, above note 2 at para. 130. 




in the land, regardless of the Indigenous uses in the past.57 Perhaps this apparent 
tension in his judgment can be resolved by adopting the external/internal dichotomy 
of Aboriginal title outlined above: vis-à-vis the outside world, Aboriginal title 
entails generic rights that arise at common law from exclusive occupation, whereas 
internally, Aboriginal title is governed by pre-existing Indigenous law that 
continued after Crown assertion of sovereignty and is alterable through the exercise 
of Indigenous peoples’ governance authority.58 
 This brings us to the most recent Supreme Court decision on Aboriginal title, 
Tsilhqot’in Nation, that resolved some but not all of the uncertainties in the earlier 
jurisprudence. 
 
3.  Tsilhqot’in Nation v. British Columbia59 
 
As is well known, in Tsilhqot’in Nation the Supreme Court issued a declaration of 
Aboriginal title for the first time in Canadian judicial history. This happened 
because the factual record, based on extensive evidence presented at trial, led the 
Supreme Court to accept the conclusion of Justice Vickers that the Tsilhqot’in had 
proven their title over a large portion of the claim area in accordance with the test 
laid down by the Court in Delgamuukw.60 
  In her unanimous judgment, Chief Justice McLachlin settled a number of 
                     
57 See Marshall/Bernard, above note 2 at para. 136, where LeBel J. also stated (somewhat 
enigmatically in my view) in reference to the concept of a usufruct that, “[i]f this form of 
dominium utile is recognized as belonging to aboriginal peoples and the dominium directum is 
considered to be in the Crown, then it seems to follow that the test for proof of aboriginal title 
cannot simply reflect common law concepts of property and ownership.” 
58 See Brian Slattery, “The Generative Structure of Aboriginal Rights”, in Patrick Macklem and 
Douglas Sanderson, eds., From Recognition to Reconciliation: Essays on the Constitutional 
Entrenchment of Aboriginal and Treaty Rights (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2016), 
100, especially at 104, 106; Slattery, “Metamorphosis”, above note 27 at 270; Slattery, 
“Constitutional Dimensions”, above note 19 at 52-54. 
59 Tsilhqot’in Nation, S.C.C., above note 3. 
60 Ibid. at paras. 51-66. 
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issues, such as making clear that Aboriginal title is territorial rather than site-
specific, and deciding that the doctrine of interjurisdictional immunity no longer 
operates to prevent provincial laws from applying to Aboriginal title lands.61 She 
did not refer to the St. Catherine’s case once in her judgment, instead starting her 
historical review of the jurisprudence on Aboriginal title and other Aboriginal rights 
with Calder. After summarizing the main principles from the case law governing 
Aboriginal title and rights, and deciding that lack of precise delineation of the 
territorial boundaries of Aboriginal title in the pleadings is not a reason for 
dismissing title claims,62 she moved on to the test for proving Aboriginal title. 
Relying on Delgamuukw, she affirmed that Aboriginal title depends on proof of 
exclusive occupation of land at the time of Crown assertion of sovereignty, which in 
British Columbia occurred in 1846. In so doing, she accepted that exclusive 
occupation is the source of Aboriginal title. 
 In assessing whether the evidence has met the requirements for proof of 
Aboriginal title – namely, sufficiency of occupation, continuity (where present 
occupation is relied upon to show occupation at the time of Crown sovereignty), 
and exclusivity – McLachlin C.J. cautioned that 
... the court must be careful not to lose or distort the Aboriginal 
perspective by forcing ancestral practices into the square boxes of 
common law concepts, thus frustrating the goal of faithfully translating 
pre-sovereignty Aboriginal interests into equivalent modern legal rights. 
Sufficiency, continuity and exclusivity are not ends in themselves, but 
inquiries that shed light on whether Aboriginal title is established.63 
                     
61 For further discussion, see Kent McNeil, “Exclusive Occupation and Joint Aboriginal Title” 
(2015) 48 U.B.C. L. Rev. 82 [McNeil, “Exclusive Occupation”], and “Aboriginal Title and the 
Provinces after Tsilhqot’in Nation” (2015) 71 Supreme Court L. Rev. (2d) 67 [McNeil, 
“Aboriginal Title and the Provinces”]. 
62 At trial, Vickers J. declined to issue a declaration of title because, even though he found that 
title had been proven over a large area of land, the claim area described in the pleadings included 
lands where title had not been proven: Tsilhqot’in Nation v. British Columbia, [2008] 1 C.N.L.R. 
112 (B.C.S.C.) [Tsilhqot’in Nation, B.C.S.C.], at paras. 102-30. 




 Turning to the sufficiency requirement, which she said “lies at the heart of 
this appeal”, she said it “must be approached from both the common law 
perspective and the Aboriginal perspective”, and that the “Aboriginal perspective 
focuses on laws, practices, customs and traditions of the group (Delgamuukw, at 
para. 148).”64 Inclusion of “laws” here is significant because, as we have seen, that 
aspect of the Aboriginal perspective was not mentioned in her judgment in 
Marshall/Bernard. The question, then, is what role do Indigenous laws play. 
 Chief Justice McLachlin’s discussion of the sufficiency requirement focuses 
on actual presence on, control, and use of land: 
To sufficiently occupy the land for purposes of title, the Aboriginal 
group in question must show that it has historically acted in a way that 
would communicate to third parties that it held the land for its own 
purposes. This standard does not demand notorious or visible use akin to 
proving a claim for adverse possession, but neither can the occupation 
be purely subjective or internal. There must be evidence of a strong 
presence on or over the land claimed, manifesting itself in acts of 
occupation that could reasonably be interpreted as demonstrating that 
the land in question belonged to, was controlled by, or was under the 
exclusive stewardship of the claimant group. As just discussed, the kinds 
of acts necessary to indicate a permanent presence and intention to hold 
and use the land for the group’s purposes are dependent on the manner 
of life of the people and the nature of the land. Cultivated fields, 
constructed dwelling houses, invested labour, and a consistent presence 
on parts of the land may be sufficient, but are not essential to establish 
occupation. The notion of occupation must also reflect the way of life of 
the Aboriginal people, including those who were nomadic or semi-
nomadic.65 
 
Summing up, she said that 
... what is required is a culturally sensitive approach to sufficiency of 
occupation based on the dual perspectives of the Aboriginal group in 
                     
64 Ibid. at paras. 33-35. 
65 Ibid. at para. 38. 
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question – its laws, practices, size, technological ability and the 
character of the land claimed – and the common law notion of 
possession as a basis for title.... The common law test for possession – 
which requires an intention to occupy or hold land for the purposes of 
the occupant – must be considered alongside the perspective of the 
Aboriginal group which, depending on its size and manner of living, 
might conceive of possession of land in a somewhat different manner 
than did the common law.66 
 
 At no point in her discussion did Chief Justice McLachlin explain how Indigenous 
laws operate to establish sufficiency of occupation. They are part of the Aboriginal 
perspective, presumably shedding light on the nature of the Indigenous people’s 
relationship with the land. But the only concrete example of how Indigenous law relates 
to the occupancy required for title was provided in her discussion of exclusivity, where 
she quoted with approval the following passage from Lamer C.J.’s judgment in 
Delgamuukw: 
A consideration of the aboriginal perspective may also lead to the 
conclusion that trespass by other aboriginal groups does not undermine, 
and that presence of those groups by permission may reinforce, the 
exclusive occupation of the aboriginal group asserting title. For 
example, the aboriginal group asserting the claim to aboriginal title may 
have trespass laws which are proof of exclusive occupation, such that 
the presence of trespassers does not count as evidence against 
exclusivity. As well, aboriginal laws under which permission may be 
granted to other aboriginal groups to use or reside even temporarily on 
land would reinforce the finding of exclusive occupation. Indeed, if that 
permission were the subject of treaties between the aboriginal nations in 
question, those treaties would also form part of the aboriginal 
perspective.67 
 
It therefore appears that the role of Indigenous law is as evidence of the exclusive 
occupation required for title. Nowhere in her judgment does McLachlin C.J. adopt 
                     
66 Ibid. at para. 41. 
67 Delgamuukw, S.C.C., above note 1 at para. 157, quoted in Tsilhqot’in Nation, S.C.C., above 
note 3 at para. 49. 
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Lamer C.J.’s suggestion in Delgamuukw that Indigenous law and the relationship 
between it and the common law can be a second source of Aboriginal title. 
 So what happened to Tsilhqot’in law at the moment of Crown assertion of 
sovereignty in 1846? Chief Justice McLachlin clearly envisaged its existence up to 
then, but did not explain whether or how it operates from that time forward. 
However, as demonstrated by the factual findings of Justice Vickers in Tsilhqot’in 
Nation, the British presence in the Tsilhqot’in territory in 1846 was no greater than 
in the territories of the Gitksan and Wet’suwet’en further north.68 The Oregon 
Boundary Treaty of that year was really a non-event for the Tsilhqot’in, as they 
continued to live by their laws and govern themselves thereafter.69 So as discussed 
above in relation to the Gitksan and Wet’suwet’en, internally the Tsilhqot’in’s 
Aboriginal title must be sourced in and continue to be regulated by their own laws 
and governance authority. And yet, in her discussion of the application of provincial 
laws to their Aboriginal title lands, McLachlin C.J. suggested that there could be a 
legal vacuum if provincial legislation was excluded by the doctrine of 
interjurisdictional immunity.70 What about Tsilhqot’in law? If it survived Crown 
assertion of sovereignty and continued after 1846, as it must have, how and when 
did it cease to be in effect? With respect, I think the Supreme Court has overlooked 
these questions and failed to take the continuing application of Tsilhqot’in law and 
governance authority into account.71 
 Externally, Chief Justice McLachlin affirmed the description of the nature 
and content of Aboriginal title presented by Lamer C.J. in Delgamuukw. Relying on 
Dickson J.’s judgment in Guerin, she stated: 
                     
68 See Tsilhqot’in Nation, B.C.S.C., above note 62 paras. 232-58. 
69 On Tsilhqot’in governance and laws, see ibid. at paras. 356-63, 426-32. 
70 Tsilhqot’in Nation, S.C.C., above note 3 at para. 147. 
71 For further discussion, see McNeil, “Aboriginal Title and the Provinces”, above note 61 at 85-
88; Andrée Boisselle, “To Dignity Through the Back Door: Tsilhqot’in and the Aboriginal Title 
Test” (2015) 71 Supreme Court L. Rev. (2nd) 27. 
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At the time of assertion of European sovereignty, the Crown acquired 
radical or underlying title to all the land in the province. This Crown 
title, however, was burdened by the pre-existing legal rights of 
Aboriginal people who occupied and used the land prior to European 
arrival. The doctrine of terra nullius (that no one owned the land prior to 
European assertion of sovereignty) never applied in Canada, as 
confirmed by the Royal Proclamation of 1763. The Aboriginal interest 
in land that burdens the Crown’s underlying title is an independent legal 
interest, which gives rise to a fiduciary duty on the part of the Crown.72 
 
From this passage, it appears that the Crown could acquire the radical or underlying 
title to Tsilhqot’in lands by mere assertion, despite the fact that there was no British 
governmental presence in the Tsilhqot’in territory and no way of enforcing English 
law there.73 But as discussed above, in principle this must mean that the 
Tsilhqot’in’s Aboriginal title, which at common law also vested at same time in 
1846,74 was protected by that law against the outside world, including the Crown, 
from then on.75 This is the external aspect of Aboriginal title. At the time, the 
Crown’s underlying title would have been purely notional, whereas the internal 
Aboriginal title of the Tsilhqot’in under their own laws and governance authority 
would have been very real. But even after the Crown did establish its own 
                     
72 Tsilhqot’in Nation, S.C.C., above note 3 at para. 69. 
73 For critical commentary, see John Borrows, “The Durability of Terra Nullius: Tsilhqot’in 
Nation v British Columbia” (2015) 48 U.B.C. L. Rev. 701; Felix Hoehn, “Back to the Future – 
Reconciliation and Indigenous Sovereignty after Tsilhqot’in” (2016) 67 U.N.B. L. Rev. 109; 
Kent McNeil, “The Doctrine of Discovery Reconsidered: Reflecting on Robert J Miller, Jacinta 
Ruru, Larissa Behrendt, and Tracey Lindberg, Discovering Indigenous Lands: The Doctrine of 
Discovery in the English Colonies and Felix Hoehn, Reconciling Sovereignties: Aboriginal 
Nations and Canada”, forthcoming 53:2 Osgoode Hall L.J. 
74 Delgamuukw, S.C.C., above note 1 at para. 145. 
75 As a property right that could “compete on an equal footing with other proprietary interests” 
(Delgamuukw, S.C.C., above note 1 at para. 113), Aboriginal title would be entitled to the same 
common law protection as other property rights: see Kent McNeil, “Aboriginal Title as a 
Constitutionally Protected Property Right”, in Owen Lippert, ed., Beyond the Nass Valley: 
National Implications of the Supreme Court’s Delgamuukw Decision (Vancouver: The Fraser 
Institute, 2000), 55, republished in McNeil, Emerging Justice?, above note 18 at 292; McNeil, 
“Extinguishment of Aboriginal Title”, above note 10. 
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governmental authority over the Tsilhqot’in territory, which may have occurred as a 
result of the Chilcotin War in the 1860s,76 Tsilhqot’in law and governance in 
relation to land must have continued, both as a practical matter and as a matter of 
law. There is no other way their Aboriginal title could have been operational on the 
ground, as there would have been no applicable statute or common law to govern 
their communal enjoyment and use of the land internally.77 
 Chief Justice McLachlin went on to clarify what the Crown’s underlying title 
amounts to: 
The content of the Crown’s underlying title is what is left when 
Aboriginal title is subtracted from it: s. 109 of the Constitution Act, 
1867; Delgamuukw. As we have seen, Delgamuukw establishes that 
Aboriginal title gives “the right to exclusive use and occupation of the 
land ... for a variety of purposes”, not confined to traditional or 
“distinctive” uses (para. 117). In other words, Aboriginal title is a 
beneficial interest in the land: Guerin, at p. 382. In simple terms, the title 
holders have the right to the benefits associated with the land – to use it, 
enjoy it and profit from its economic development. As such, the Crown 
does not retain a beneficial interest in Aboriginal title land.78 
 
Aboriginal titleholders are therefore entitled to the entire benefit of the land, 
whereas the Crown’s underlying title is limited to “two related elements – a 
fiduciary duty owed by the Crown to Aboriginal people when dealing with 
Aboriginal lands, and the right to encroach on Aboriginal title if the government can 
justify this in the broader public interest under s. 35 of the Constitution Act, 
                     
76 See Tsilhqot’in Nation, B.C.S.C., above note 62 at paras. 267-86. 
77 At common law, property rights are held by individuals and corporations, not by communities, 
so there is no common law in relation to communal rights that could apply directly in this 
context: see McNeil, “Exclusive Occupation”, above note 60 at 834-38, 860-71. Nor am I aware 
of any colonial, provincial, or federal legislation that would have applied to govern the internal 
dimension of Aboriginal title. Even today there is no such legislation, nor would it necessarily be 
constitutional, which is one reason why Indigenous law must apply to govern Aboriginal title 
internally: see McNeil, “Aboriginal Title and the Provinces”, above note 61. 
78 Tsilhqot’in Nation, S.C.C., above note 3 at para. 70. 
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1982.”79 Fiduciary obligations and encroachment do not relate directly to the issues 
of source, nature, and content of Aboriginal title – they involve constitutional issues 




In summary, the Tsilhqot’in Nation decision confirms that Aboriginal title comes 
from exclusive occupation of land at the time of Crown assertion of sovereignty, not 
from the Royal Proclamation of 1763. It is proprietary in nature and encompasses 
the entire beneficial interest in the land, subject to the inherent limit that the land 
cannot be used in ways that will substantially deprive future generations of its 
benefit.81 The Crown’s underlying title has no beneficial content whatsoever. The 
Aboriginal perspective, including Indigenous law, must be taken into account in 
assessing claims to Aboriginal title, but it is unclear from Chief Justice McLachlin’s 
judgment whether this law’s role is limited to being part of the evidence used to 
prove exclusive occupation. As I have argued, Indigenous law and authority should 
also govern the internal dimensions of Aboriginal title, while the common law 
                     
79 Ibid. at para. 71. In my respectful opinion, the power to encroach on Aboriginal title flows not 
from the provincial Crown’s underlying proprietary title derived from s.109 of the Constitution 
Act, 1867, but from its legislative authority under s.92 of that Act, especially s.92(13) which 
empowers provincial legislatures to enact laws in relation to “Property and Civil Rights in the 
Province”. See Tsilhqot’in Nation, S.C.C., above note 3 at paras. 102-03. 
80 See Kent McNeil, “Fiduciary Obligations and Aboriginal Peoples”, in Mark R. Gillen and 
Faye Woodman, eds., The Law of Trusts: A Contextual Approach, 3rd ed. (Toronto: Emond 
Publishing, 2015), 839; Kent McNeil, “The Crown’s Fiduciary Obligations in the Era of 
Aboriginal Self-Government” (2009) 88 Can. Bar Rev. 1; McNeil, “Aboriginal Title and the 
Provinces”, above note 61. 
81 McLachlin C.J. affirmed the inherent limit while modifying it so that it is less dependent on 
traditional uses: see note 19 above. In addition, and perhaps even more importantly, she said it 
also applies in the context of government infringement of Aboriginal title: “The beneficial 
interest in the land held by the Aboriginal group vests communally in the title-holding group. 
This means that incursions on Aboriginal title cannot be justified if they would substantially 




governs the rights of the Indigenous titleholders as against the outside world. 
